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ABSTRACT
Substitute model black box attacks can create adversarial examples
for a target model just by accessing its output labels. This poses a
major challenge to machine learning models in practice, particu-
larly in security sensitive applications. The 01 loss model is known
to be more robust to outliers and noise than convex models that
are typically used in practice. Motivated by these properties we
present 01 loss linear and 01 loss dual layer neural network mod-
els as a defense against transfer based substitute model black box
attacks. We compare the accuracy of adversarial examples from
substitute model black box attacks targeting our 01 loss models
and their convex counterparts for binary classification on popu-
lar image benchmarks. Our 01 loss dual layer neural network has
an adversarial accuracy of 66.2%, 58%, 60.5%, and 57% on MNIST,
CIFAR10, STL10, and ImageNet respectively whereas the sigmoid
activated logistic loss counterpart has accuracies of 63.5%, 19.3%,
14.9%, and 27.6%. Except for MNIST the convex counterparts have
substantially lower adversarial accuracies. We show practical ap-
plications of our models to deter traffic sign and facial recognition
adversarial attacks. On GTSRB street sign and CelebA facial detec-
tion our 01 loss network has 34.6% and 37.1% adversarial accuracy
respectively whereas the convex logistic counterpart has accuracy
24% and 1.9%. Finally we show that our 01 loss network can attain
robustness on par with simple convolutional neural networks and
much higher than its convex counterpart even when attacked with
a convolutional network substitute model. Our work shows that 01
loss models offer a powerful defense against substitute model black
box attacks.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Adversarial attacks present a challenge to machine learning al-
gorithms typically based on convex losses. State of the art clas-
sifiers like the support vector machine [8] and neural networks
[15] achieve high accuracies on test data but are also vulnerable
to adversarial attacks based on minor perturbations in the data
[4, 5, 12, 16, 25]. To counter adversarial attacks many defense meth-
ods been proposed with adversarial training being the most popular
[34]. This is known to improve model robustness but also tends
to lower accuracy on clean test data that has no perturbations
[28, 28, 36].
The robustness of outliers to the 01 loss is well known [1]. Convex
loss functions such as least squares are affected by both correct and
incorrectly classified outliers and hinge is affected by incorrectly
classified outliers whereas the 01 loss is robust to both [21, 35].
In addition to being robust to outliers the 01 loss is also robust to
noise in the training data [11, 20] and under this loss minimizing the
empirical risk amounts to minimizing the empirical adversarial risk
[13, 19] with certain assumptions of noise. We conjecture that these
properties may translate to robustness against substitute model
black box adversarial attacks that typically succeed in fooling state
of the art classifiers [24].
To test this we first develop stochastic coordinate descent solvers
for 01 loss based upon prior work [35]. We extend the previous
work to a non-linear dual layer 01 loss network that we call MLP01.
For the task of binary classification on standard image recognition
benchmarks we show that our linear 01 loss solver and the MLP01
network are both as accurate as their convex counterparts, namely
the linear support vector machine and the sigmoid activated logistic
loss dual layer network. We then subject all methods to a substitute
model black box attack [24] and find our 01 loss models to be more
robust than their convex counterparts for binary classification on
several different image benchmarks. Thus our 01 loss models offer
an effective defense against substitute model black box attacks.
Below we describe our methods followed by detailed experimental
results.
2 METHODS
2.1 A dual layer 01 loss neural network
The problem of determining the hyperplane with minimum number
of misclassifications in a binary classification problem is known to
be NP-hard [2]. In mainstream machine learning literature this is
called minimizing the 01 loss [31] given in Objective 1,
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2n argminw,w0
∑
i
(1 − siдn(yi (wT xi +w0))) (1)
where w ∈ Rd , w0 ∈ R is our hyperplane, and xi ∈ Rd ,yi ∈
{+1,−1}.∀i = 0...n − 1 are our training data. We extend the 01 loss
to a simple two layer neural network with k hidden nodes and sign
activation that we call the MLP01 loss. This objective for binary
classification can be given as
1
2n argminW ,W0,w,w0
∑
i
(1 − siдn(yi (wT (siдn(W T xi +W0)) +w0))) (2)
whereW ∈ Rd×k ,W0 ∈ Rk are the hidden layer parameters,
w ∈ Rk ,w0 ∈ R are the final layer node parameters, xi ∈ Rd ,yi ∈
{+1,−1}.∀i = 0...n − 1 are our training data, and siдn(v ∈ Rk ) =
(siдn(v0), siдn(v1), ..., siдn(vk−1)). While this is a straightforward
model to define optimizing it is a different story altogether. Op-
timizing even a single node is NP-hard which makes optimizing
this network much harder. Note that our weights are real num-
bers as opposed to binarized neural networks whose weights are
constrained to be +1 and -1 or 1 and 0 [9, 10, 29].
2.2 Stochastic coordinate descent for 01 loss
We solve both problems with stochastic coordinate descent based
upon earlier work [35]. We initialize all parameters to random
values from the Normal distribution with mean 0 and variance 1.
We then randomly select a subset of the training data (known as a
batch) and perform the coordinate descent analog of a single step
gradient update in stochastic gradient descent [3]. We first describe
this for a linear 01 loss classifier which we obtain if we set the
number of hidden nodes to zero. In this case the parameters to
optimize are the final weight vectorw and the thresholdw0.
When the gradient is known we step in its negative direction by
a factor of the learning rate:w = w−η∇(f )where f is the objective.
In our case since the gradient does not exist we randomly select k
features (set to 64, 128, 256, and 256 for MNIST, CIFAR10, STL10,
and ImageNet respectively), modify the corresponding entries in
w by the learning rate (set to 0.17) one at a time, and accept the
modification that gives the largest decrease in the objective. Key
to our search is a heuristic to determine the optimal threshold
each time we modify an entry ofw . In this heuristic we perform a
linear search on a subset of the projectionwT xi and selectw0 that
minimizes the objective.
We repeat the above update step on randomly selected batches
for a specified number of iterations given by the user. We run 1000
iterations to ensure a deep search with an intent to maximize test
accuracy. In a dual layer network we have to optimize our hidden
nodes as well. In each of the 1000 iterations of our search we ap-
ply the same coordinate update described above, first to the final
output node and then a randomly selected hidden node. In prelimi-
nary experiments we find this to be fast and almost as effective as
optimizing all hidden nodes and the final node in each iteration.
Our intuition is that by searching on just the sampled data we
avoid local minima and across several iterations we can explore
a broad portion of the search space. Throughout iterations we
keep track of the best parameters that minimize our objective on
the full dataset. The problem with our search described here is
that it will return different solutions depending upon the initial
starting point. To make it more stable we run it 32 times from
different random seeds and use the majority vote for prediction. In
the Supplementary Material (http://s000.tinyupload.com/?file_id=
07384641501849770229) we provide full details of our algorithms.
2.3 Implementation, experimental platform,
and image data
We implement our 01 loss models in Python and Pytorch [26],
and both MLP and SVM (LinearSVC class) in scikit-learn [27]. We
optimize MLP with stochastic gradient descent that has a batch size
of 200, momentumof 0.9, and learning rate of 0.01 (.001 for ImageNet
data). We ran all experiments on Intel Xeon 6142 2.6GHz CPUs and
NVIDIA Titan RTX GPU machines (for parallelizing multiple votes).
Our SCD01 and MLP01 source codes, supplementary programs, and
data are available from https://github.com/zero-one-loss/mlp01.
We experiment on four popular image benchmarks: MNIST [17],
CIFAR10 [14], STL10 [7], and ImageNet [30]. Between classes 0 and
1 in MNIST (also digits 0 and 1) we have 12,665 training images
and 2115 test images each of size 28 × 28. In CIFAR10 between
classes 0 and 1 we have 10,000 32 × 32 × 3 training images and
2000 test ones and in STL10 [7] we have 1000 96 × 96 × 3 training
images and 1600 test. In ImageNet classes 0 and 1 contain about
2580 256 × 256 × 3 training images and 100 test ones. We change
the split so as to increase the test data size so that we can better
train the black box attack substitute model. We divide the training
set into two parts: the first containing 1280 for training and 1300
for test. We normalize each image in each benchmark by dividing
each pixel value by 255.
3 RESULTS
We refer to our linear (no hidden layer) and non-linear (dual layer
with 20 hidden nodes) 01 loss models as SCD01 and MLP01 respec-
tively. As convex counterparts we select the linear support vector
machine (with a cross-validated regularization parameter) denoted
as SVM and a dual layer 20 hidden node neural network with sig-
moid activation and logistic loss (MLP). We use the majority vote of
32 runs for our 01 loss models to improve stability and do the same
for SVM and MLP by majority voting on 32 bootstrapped samples.
We refer to the accuracy on the test data as clean data test ac-
curacy. An incorrectly classified adversarial example is considered
a successful attack whereas a correctly classified adversarial is a
failed one. Thus when we refer to accuracy of adversarial examples
it is the same as 100 − attacksuccessrate . The lower the accuracy
the more effective the attack.
3.1 Substitute model black box attacks
We use adversarial data augmentation [23] to iteratively train a
substitute model trained on label outputs from the target model.
In each epoch we generate white box adversaries targeting the
substitute model with the FGSM method [12] and evaluate them on
the target. Since we are considering only binary classification our
black box attacks are untargeted. See Supplementary Material (http:
//s000.tinyupload.com/?file_id=07384641501849770229) for the full
substitute model learning algorithms but it is essentially the method
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Figure 1: Substitute model black box attack
of Papernot et. al. [23]. Figure 1 gives a visual overview of the
substitute model black box attack.
3.1.1 Convex substitute model. In Figure 2 we see the accuracy of
target models on adversaries generated from a convex substitute
model. Specifically we use a three layer neural network as the
substitute model with sigmoid activation, logistic loss, and 200
nodes in each hidden layer. We use ϵ values on MNIST, CIFAR10,
STL10, and ImageNet that are typical in the literature. For MNIST
ϵ = .2 corresponds to a change of 255× .2 = 51 in each pixel and for
CIFAR10, STL10, and ImageNet ϵ = .0625 corresponds to a change
of 255 × .0625 = 16 in each pixel.
In MNIST (Figure 2(a)) we don’t see a considerable difference
between the 01 loss and convex sibling models although MLP01
has the highest accuracy. On CIFAR10, STL10, and ImageNet we
see much more pronounced differences. In CIFAR10 (Figure 2(b))
we see that even though both MLP and MLP01 start off with clean
test accuracies of 88% and 86% respectively, at the end of the 20th
epoch MLP01 has 58% accuracy on adversarial examples while MLP
has 19.3% accuracy.
We see similar results on STL10 and ImageNet (Figure 2(c) and(d)).
Both MLP and MLP01 start off with high similar clean test accura-
cies but by epoch 20 MLP01 has 60.5% and 57% adversarial accuracy
on STL10 and ImageNet respectively whereas MLP has 14.9% and
27.6%. In the same way the linear 01 loss (SCD01) has similar clean
test accuracy to its hinge counterpart in the SVM but is much more
adversarially robust on all datasets except for MNIST.
3.1.2 01 loss substitute model. In Figure 3 we see the results of a
black box attack with SCD01 single run as the substitute model
attacking single runs of target models. In each epoch of the sub-
stitute model training we use the SCD01 model parameters w
to generate adversaries as x ′ = x − ϵysiдn(w) where siдn(w) =
(siдn(w1), siдn(w2), ..., siдn(wd )), ϵ is the distortion, and y is the
label of x . This is the same method to generate adversaries from
any linear classifier as done previously [23]. We see that adversaries
Figure 2: Accuracy of adversarial samples in each epoch of
substitute model training. At epoch 0 we have the accuracy
of the target model on clean test data.
produced from this model hardly affect any of the target models in
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Figure 3: We use SCD01 single run as the substitute model
to attack single runs of the target models on CIFAR10 class
0 vs. 1. In epoch 0 are the clean test accuracies.
any of the epochs. Even when the target is SCD01 and trained with
the same initial seed as the substitute the adversaries are ineffective.
Further investigation reveals that the percentage of test data
whose labels match between the 01 loss substitute and its target
(known as the label match rate) is high but the label match rate
on adversarial examples is much lower (see Figure 4). Thus even
though the SCD01 manages to approximate the target boundary
its direction is different which gives ineffective adversaries. This
is due to the non-uniqueness of 01 loss which makes single run
solutions different from each other. Thus as a substitute model in
black box attacks 01 loss is ineffective even in attacking itself.
3.2 Applications: street sign and facial
recognition adversarial attacks
We now turn to two practical problems where adversarial attacks
pose a problem. First is the task of street sign detection by au-
tonomous vehicles [32] and the second is facial recognition that are
used by government and security systems. We consider 2816 train
and 900 test 48 × 48 × 3 images of street signs of 60 and 120 mph
from the GTSRB street sign dataset [33] and 1000 train and 1000
test 96 × 96 × 3 images of brown and black hair individuals from
the CelebA facial recognition benchmark [18]. For GTSRB we use
a perturbation of ϵ = 0.03125 and for CelebA we use ϵ = 0.0625 in
the black box attack.
In Figure 5 we see that the MLP01 attains comparable clean test
accuracy to SVM and MLP but is more robust just like we saw in the
benchmarks above. We show sample adversarial images in Figure 6
obtained from the black box attack with different target models.
Even though the adversarial images targeting MLP01 show a visual
distortion they are correctly classified by it.
3.3 Comparison to convolutional neural
networks
We finally compare black box robustness of our 01 loss models to
simple convolutional neural networks. We find the pair of CIFAR10
classes where MLP01 achieves the highest test accuracy (this turns
out to be classes 6 vs 8). We then train MLP01 and MLP each with
(a) Percent of same labels between substitute and target on clean data
(b) Percent of same labels between substitute and target on adversarial data
Figure 4: SCD01 substitute model can approximate the tar-
get on CIFAR10 class 0 vs. 1 as shown in the label match
rates between them (see (a)). But SCD01 sourced adversaries
have a lower match rate which indicates the direction of the
SCD01 boundary is different from the targets and thus its
adversaries have little effect on the targets.
400 hidden nodes and two convolutional neural networks. We take
LeNet [17] and SimpleNet80 that has the convolutional layers from
LeNet followed by a single hidden layer of 80 nodes. The latter is a
watered down version of LeNet with fewer hidden layers.
We use a convolutional neural network with four convolutional
blocks as the substitute model. In each convolutional block we
have a 3 × 3 convolutional kernel followed by max pool and batch
normalization. In the first, second, third, and fourth layer we have
32, 64, 128, and 256 kernels and a final layer for the output. Thus
the substitute model here is much more sophisticated and powerful
than the one used in our experiments above.
In Figure 7 we see that MLP01 has comparable clean test accu-
racy to all the convex models including its convex counterpart MLP.
However, its robustness is much higher than MLP and on-par with
the convolutional models that have the advantage of convolutions
over our model. In fact we see that MLP01’s robustness even sur-
passes that of SimpleNet80 after the tenth epoch of the substitute
model training. Thus we see that even when the substitute model
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Figure 5: Accuracy of adversarial samples in each epoch of
substitute model training. At epoch 0 we have the accuracy
of the target model on clean test data.
Clean MLP01 MLP SVM
Figure 6: Clean and adversarial images from CelebA in the
top row and GTSRB in the bottom one. The adversarial im-
ages are obtained from the black box attack when targeting
MLP01, MLP, and SVM with ϵ = 0.0625. The adversarial im-
ages shown here are misclassified SVM andMLP but are cor-
rectly classified by MLP01.
is a sophisticated convolutional network it is hard to attack our
model.
4 DISCUSSION
Binarized neural networks [9, 10, 29] have weights and activations
constrained to be near +1 and -1 (or 1 and 0) whereas our model
Figure 7: Black box attacks with a convolutional neural net-
work of four convolutional blocks as the substitute model.
In epoch 0 are the clean test accuracies. We see that MLP01’s
adversarial accuracy is on-par with convolutional networks
but MLP has much lower robustness.
weights are real numbers. The purpose of those networks is ef-
ficiency as opposed to robustness. Indeed we see in recent work
that binarized networks offer marginal improvements in robustness
to substitute model black box robustness on MNIST and none in
CIFAR10 (see Tables 4 and 5 in [10] and Table 8 in [22]). In our case
we see large improvements over convex (non-binarized) models on
CIFAR10 as well as other datasets.
There is nothing to indicate that 01 loss models are robust to
boundary based black box attacks that do not require substitute
model training [4, 6]. These attacks are however computationally
expensive, require separate computations for each example, and
require in the order of thousands of queries per example. In com-
parison, as we have seen in this study, a transfer based substitute
model attack can create effective adversaries within just five to ten
epochs (queries) and once it has been trained it can create adver-
saries without querying the target. Thus it can be more effective
and dangerous as an attack method than boundary based ones.
Interestingly the robustness of 01 loss neural network is on-par
with simple convolutional models that have the powerful advantage
of convolutions which our 01 loss models lack. As future work 01
loss convolutions may be a promising avenue for models with high
Woodstock ’18, June 03–05, 2018, Woodstock, NY Yang et al.
clean test accuracy and high adversarial accuracy as well. Another
promising avenue is to perform adversarial training for our models
to further boost robustness [16].
5 CONCLUSION
Our work here shows that 01 loss models are more robust to substi-
tute model black box attacks than their equivalent convex models
on several datasets for binary classification. Thus our models could
be used as an effective defense method against transfer based black
box attacks.
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